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NOTES
IS A BAN ON PLEA BARGAINING AN ETHICAL ABUSE OF
DISCRETION? A BRONX COUNTY, NEW YORK
CASE STUDY
Roland Acevedo*
INTRODUCTION
Plea bargaining' is an essential2 and important3 component of the
American criminal justice system. The significance of plea bargaining
within our criminal justice system is readily revealed by a single statis-
tic-plea bargaining accounts for ninety percent of all criminal convic-
tions in the United States.4 As the principal means of resolution in
criminal cases, plea bargaining is no longer "some adjunct to the crim-
inal justice system; it is the criminal justice system."5 Nonetheless,
although plea bargaining has gained near unanimous acceptance
among scholars and practitioners6 and its use is encouraged by the
United States Supreme Court,7 a number of jurisdictions have banned
the practice.
In 1975, in an attempt to restore the public's confidence in the exist-
ence of a system in which defendants could be fairly charged, tried,
* I would like to thank Professor Bruce A. Green for his advice and guidance in
the preparation of this Note. I am also grateful to the Stein Scholars Program for
providing the academic climate in which I was able to explore these issues of legal
ethics.
1. Plea bargaining is defined as "[t]he process whereby the accused and the pros-
ecutor in a criminal case work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case sub-
ject to court approval." Black's Law Dictionary 1152 (6th ed. 1990).
2. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,260 (1971) (noting that plea bargaining
is essential because it allows the states and the federal government to save resources
by avoiding full-scale trials).
3. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 361-62 (1978); Blackledge v. Allison,
431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
4. Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 50,50 (1968) [hereinafter The Prosecutor's Role]; Susan E. Gegan & Nicholas E.
Rodriguez, Note, Victims' Roles in the Criminal Justice System" A Fallacy of Victim
Empowerment?, 8 St. John's J. Legal Comment. 225, 229 n.16 (1992); see also Bruce
A. Green, "Package" Plea Bargaining and the Prosecutor's Duty of Good Faith, 25
Crim. L. Bull. 507, 509 (1989) ("The overwhelming majority of criminal cases in this
country are resolved by guilty pleas, most of which are the product of plea bargain-
ing." (citation omitted)).
5. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Contract, 101 Yale
LJ. 1909, 1912 (1992).
6. Robert A. Weninger, The Abolition of Plea Bargaining: A Case Study of El
Paso County, Texas, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 265, 265 (1987).
7. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) ("Properly administered,
[plea bargaining] is to be encouraged.").
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and sentenced,8 Alaska became the first state to ban plea bargaining.9
The Alaskan ban remained in effect for a decade, until plea bargaining
resumed in 1985.10 El Paso County, Texas implemented a second but
shorter lived ban in 1978.1" The El Paso County ban, designed to
bring about sentence uniformity among defendants, 2 was in effect for
six years before the county restored plea bargaining.' 3 At least three
other jurisdictions have implemented experimental 4 or limited 15 plea
bargaining bans that also proved ineffective.' 6
The latest jurisdiction to ban plea bargaining is Bronx County, New
York ("Bronx"). In November, 1992, Bronx County District Attorney
Robert Johnson 17 announced that his office would no longer plea bar-
gain with criminal defendants who had been indicted for felony of-
fenses.' 8 While the Bronx District Attorney's decision was portrayed
by the press as a ban on plea bargaining,19 the term ban is a misnomer
when used in the context of the Bronx plea bargaining policy. The
Bronx District Attorney did not ban plea bargaining totally; the prac-
tice is still permitted with defendants who have not been indicted.20
Once the grand jury indicts a defendant on a felony offense, however,
no plea bargaining is permitted.2 ' Under the new plea policy, an in-
dicted defendant must plead guilty to the highest count of the indict-
ment or face a trial.22
8. Teresa White Cams & John A. Kruse, Alaska's Ban on Plea Bargaining
Reevaluated, 75 Judicature 310, 310-11 (1992).
9. Id. at 311.
10. Id. at 317.
11. See Weninger, supra note 6, at 270.
12. See id. at 275-76.
13. Id. at 270.
14. See Cams & Kruse, supra note 8, at 311 n.11 (discussing an experimental plea
bargaining ban on drug trafficking cases prosecuted in a Michigan County).
15. Id. (discussing Detroit, Michigan's ban on plea bargaining with defendants
charged with felony firearm offenses); Jeff Brown, Proposition 8. Origins and Im-
pact-A Public Defender's Perspective, 23 Pac. L.J. 881, 939 (1992) (discussing Cali-
fornia's ban on plea bargaining with defendants charged with "serious" offenses).
16. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 15, at 941-42 (discussing how plea bargaining still
occurs with defendants charged with "serious" crimes despite a ban prohibiting the
practice).
17. Robert Johnson was elected to the Bronx County District Attorney's Office in
November 1988 in a special election held to fill the vacancy created by the death of
long time Bronx District Attorney Mario Merola. Telephone Interview with Office of
Public Affairs, Bronx County District Attorney's Office (Nov. 8, 1995). Mr. Johnson
was reelected to new four year terms in 1991 and 1995. Id.
18. Anthony M. DeStefano, DA: No Deals-Bronx No Plea Bargain Order
Shocks Judges, Lawyers, N.Y. Newsday, Nov. 24, 1992, at 3, 3 [hereinafter DA: No
Deals]; Martin Fox, Problems Seen with Johnson's End to Plea Bargains, N.Y. L.J.,
Nov. 25, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter Problems Seen].
19. Anthony M. DeStefano, Court Clog in Bronx: DA Plea Bargain Ban has
Backlog at 10-Year High, N.Y. Newsday, Jan. 13, 1993, at 29 [hereinafter Court Clog
in Bronx].
20. DA: No Deals, supra note 18, at 3.
21. See iL
22. Id.
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The Bronx District Attorney's plea bargaining ban "shocked" the
entire legal community.' In the Bronx, a county that prosecutes
more than 10,000 felonies annually and where the rate of felony pros-
ecution has increased fifty percent since 1985,. plea bargaining ap-
peared to be an indispensable tool of the criminal justice system- 5
Indeed, prior to the implementation of the ban, plea bargaining ac-
counted for resolutions in approximately eighty-five percent of all
Bronx felony prosecutions.'
Not surprisingly, the imposition of the ban set off a furor among
judges, defense attorneys, and other officials27 who feared a "cata-
strophic backlog of cases,"'-8 "unfair" treatment of defendants, 9 "jail
overcrowding, " 30 and "violations of a federal court order"3' that could
expose New York City to fines and force the release of prisoners?2
Three years have elapsed since the Bronx plea bargaining ban went
into effect and many of the expressed fears are now realities.33 While
23. Id
24. Bernice Kanner, Rough Justice.: A Young Prosecutor and Her Team Battle the
Odds in the Bronx, New York, May 10, 1993, at 46, 48.
25. Problems Seen, supra note 18, at 5 ("Plea negotiations are as important to the
[Bronx] court system as breathing, sleeping and eating are to human[s] .... "(quoting
Bronx Administrative Judge Burton B. Roberts)).
26. Anthony M. DeStefano, No-Plea Policy Draws Fire, N.Y. Newsday, Nov. 25,
1992, at 23 [hereinafter Policy Draws Fire]; Problems Seen, supra note 18, at 1.
27. Court Clog in Bronx, supra note 19, at 29.
28. See Policy Draws Fire, supra note 26, at 23.
29. Martin Fox, Next Six Weeks Seen Critical in Bronx Courts: No Impact Yet from
Bar on Plea Bargaining, N.Y. L., Jan. 4, 1993, at 1. 2 [hereinafter Next Sir Weeks].
According to Irwin Shaw, Supervising Attorney at The Legal Aid Society's Bronx
Criminal Defense Division, the Bronx plea bargaining ban is "philosophically wrong,"
"a mistake," and "unfair" because it does not look at each case individually. Id.
30. See Problems Seen, supra note 18, at 5. Declaring that the Bronx lacked suffi-
dent court resources to try a large number of additional cases, Administrative Judge
Burton B. Roberts warned that New York City's jails would become "overcrowd[ed]."
Id.
31. Id. Matthew T. Crosson, Chief Administrator of the New York State Courts,
voiced concern that a sharp rise in the number of inmates awaiting trial at Rikers
Island could "trigger violations of a federal court order that limits the number of
prisoners in city jails and thereby requires additional facilities or release of the detain-
ees on constitutional grounds." Id.
32. Id. In 1978, New York City entered into a stipulation ("Benjamin Stipula-
tion") in which it acknowledged that pretrial detainees were being confined in over-
crowded facilities that violated the detainees' constitutional rights. See Benjamin v.
Malcolm, 495 F. Supp. 1357, 1359 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) modified 646 F. Supp. 1550, 1554
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). In that stipulation the City agreed to allow the district court to im-
pose appropriate remedies to correct the overcrowding. 495 F. Supp. at 1359. Among
the remedies imposed was a cap on the number of pretrial detainees that could be
housed in certain New York City jails. 495 F.Supp. at 1365. A sharp rise in the
number of pretrial detainees resulting from the Bronx ban could trigger violations of
the Benjamin Stipulation, expose the city to fines, and force the release of prisoners
to relieve the overcrowding. See Problems Seen, supra note 18, at 5.
33. See Anthony M. DeStefano, No Place Like Rikers-Bronx Inmates Staying
Longer, N.Y. Newsday, May 27, 1993, at 35 ("An increase in the percentage of Bronx
prisoners waiting a year or more on Rikers Island for trial is apparently traced to a
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there is little doubt that the Bronx plea bargaining ban is legal,34 its
harsh impact upon the Bronx criminal justice system raises serious
ethical concerns This Note will examine and address some of these
ethical concerns.
Part I of this Note discusses the advantages and criticisms of plea
bargaining and the prosecutor's role in the plea bargaining process.
Part II examines the origin of the Bronx plea bargaining ban and the
effects that the ban has had on the Bronx criminal justice system. Part
III examines the prosecutor's ethical duties and discusses whether the
Bronx District Attorney's behavior violated those ethical duties when
tougher no-plea-bargain policy.... ."); Plea Bargains Expedite Our System of Justice,
Buffalo News (Editorial), June 12, 1993, at C2 (noting that the trial case load in the
Bronx has skyrocketed by 24% because of the plea bargaining ban); Kathleen Lynch,
Remarks at a Panel Discussion on Ethical Issues in Plea Bargaining, Stein Center for
Ethics and Public Interest Law, Stein Scholars Program (Oct. 13, 1993) ("A prosecu-
tor's role is to look for justice. If you have a policy whereby everyone charged with a
crime gets the same exact plea, then he is not doing justice."); Chester Mirsky, The
Bronx Plea Bargaining Ban: Contradictions and the Continued Need for Reform,
Address at the Alan Fortunoff Criminal Justice Colloquiun on Evaluating the Plea
Bargaining Ban in Bronx County 8 (Oct. 25, 1993) (transcript available at New York
University School of Law) (stating that there has been a 24% increase in indictments
pending over six months in the Bronx, despite a 7.5% reduction in the total number of
indictments and informations filed since the implementation of the ban).
34. At least one New York court recently rejected a challenge to a plea bargaining
policy similar to that in place in the Bronx. See, e.g., People v. Cohen, 588 N.Y.S.2d
211, 212 (App. Div. 1992) (holding that defendant's constitutional right to equal pro-
tection was not violated by District Attorney's policy not to accept pleas to less than
the highest count of an indictment). Courts have also held that defendants do not
have a right to engage in plea bargaining. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545,
561 (1977) (holding that defendants do not have a constitutional right to plea bar-
gain); People v. Harmon, 586 N.Y.S.2d 922, 925 (App. Div. 1992) ("The People...
are not obliged to make any offer in any case . . . ."); People v. Memminger, 469
N.Y.S.2d 323, 324 (Sup. Ct. 1983) ("[D]efendants have no constitutional entitlement
to a plea offer."). In the absence of a constitutional right to plea bargain, it appears
that a ban on the process would comport with the law. Furthermore, plea bargaining
bans are not novel and have been implemented and accepted in other jurisdictions.
See supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text.
35. While seemingly a paradox, behavior that is legal in the eyes of a court can still
be unethical. The gap between legal and ethical conduct exists because courts do not
equate professional codes or canons of ethics with decisional and statutory law. See
Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 189-90 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that
the time had not yet arrived for the Court to specify the weight to be assigned to
professional codes or canons of ethics in defining attorney performance); Paretti v.
Cavalier Label Co., 722 F. Supp. 985, 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("[T]he Model Code does
not have the force of legislation or decisional law, [but only] provides guidance on
issues of professional conduct."); S & S Hotel Ventures Ltd. Partnership v. 777 S.H.
Corp., 508 N.E.2d 647, 650 (N.Y. 1987) ("The Code of Professional Responsibility
establishes ethical standards that guide attorneys in their professional conduct ....
[T]he Code provisions cannot be applied as if they were controlling statutory or deci-
sional law."). Thus, while at least one New York court has upheld a plea bargaining
policy similar to that in place in the Bronx, and a number of other jurisdictions have
approved plea bargaining bans, see supra note 34, the effects of the Bronx ban could
still lead to the conclusion that Robert Johnson abused his prosecutorial discretion
and acted unethically when he banned plea bargaining.
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he banned plea bargaining. Part IV suggests possible methods of tai-
loring the Bronx plea bargaining ban to lessen its adverse impact,
while still allowing the ban to accomplish its goal. This Note con-
cludes that while the Bronx plea bargaining ban does not violate any
specific ethics rules, it raises serious concerns that must be addressed
before the Bronx criminal justice system suffers irreparable harm.
I. PLEA BARGAINING IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM
Plea bargaining has its proponents and its critics. This section dis-
cusses the reasons for the popularity of plea bargaining, as well as the
criticisms that have been leveled against the practice. This section
also examines how the exercise of prosecutorial discretion makes the
District Attorney the principal player in the plea bargaining process.
A. The Mutual Advantages of Plea Bargaining
Criticized harshly in the past,3 6 plea bargaining has gained the im-
primatur of our courts37 and has become the most prevalent form of
case resolution in the American criminal justice system.38 The popu-
larity of plea bargaining stems from its "mutuality of advantage" 39-
the process offers advantages to defendants, prosecutors, defense
counsel, judges, victims, and the public alike.
Plea bargaining allows defendants, in exchange for the surrender of
certain constitutional rights, ° to gain prompt and final dispositions of
36. See National Prosecution Standards 218 (Nat'l District Att'ys Ass'n 1st ed.
1977) (noting that the first American court confronted with a guilty plea expressed
strong opposition); Thomas J. Gardner, Criminal Evidence-Principles, Cases and
Readings 28 (1978) (noting that American courts have historically discouraged plea
bargaining, with a number of courts calling the practice "corrupt" and "immoral");
Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alterna-
tives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. Chli. L Rev. 931, 970 (1983) ("For many
centuries, Anglo-American courts did not encourage guilty pleas but actively discour-
aged them."); The Prosecutor's Role, supra note 4, at 50 (stating that American courts
have actively discouraged guilty pleas for most of the history of the common law).
37. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 378 (1982) (stating that the
Supreme Court has accepted plea bargaining as "constitutionally legitimate"); Corbitt
v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212,222 (1978) (recognizing the state's interest in facilitating
plea bargaining); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (noting that plea
bargaining is an essential component of the administration of justice and is to be
encouraged).
38. Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. Ill. L. Rev. 37, 37.
39. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978); Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
40. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 264 (Douglas, J., concurring); People v. Taylor, 478
N.E.2d 755, 757 (N.Y. 1985). Among the rights a defendant surrenders when he
pleads guilty are the right to confront one's accusers, the right to present witnesses in
one's defense, and the right to be convicted on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Santobello, 404 U.S. at 264.
1995]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
their cases,41 "avoid the anxieties and uncertainties of a trial,"4 and
escape the maximum penalties authorized by law. Prosecutors, by
agreeing to reduce. charges" or to recommend lower sentences, 45
avoid costly, time consuming trials and, thus, conserve vital and scarce
prosecutorial resources.46 Defense counsel, most of whom are court
appointed public defenders, dispose of cases quickly and reduce over-
whelming caseloads through plea bargaining.47  Judges ameliorate
congested court calendars and conserve judicial resources through the
speedy dispositions attributed to plea bargaining.48 Victims may ben-
efit by avoiding the rigors of a trial and by not having to relive the
horrors of their victimization in the presence of the defendant and the
public. 49 Finally, the public is protected from the risks posed by de-
fendants who are free on bail while awaiting completion of the crimi-
nal proceedings against them.50
B. Criticisms of Plea Bargaining
While plea bargaining is often praised for the advantages it offers,
the process is also sharply criticized at times. A large portion of the
public disapproves of plea bargaining because it perceives the process
as being too lenient on defendants.5' Statistics support public percep-
tion-the average sentence for defendants convicted of serious felo-
nies after pleading guilty was one-half that of defendants convicted
after trials in state courts.52 In addition to viewing plea bargaining as
41. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261.
42. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
43. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 752.
44. Prosecutors engage in two types of plea bargaining-charge bargaining and
sentence negotiation. In charge bargaining, the prosector agrees to reduce the
charges against a defendant in exchange for a guilty plea. By pleading guilty to re-
duced charges, a defendant reduces the maximum time of incarceration to which he
will be subject by the sentencing judge. See Weninger, supra note 6, at 279.
45. In sentence negotiation, the second type of plea bargaining, the prosecutor
agrees to recommend a specific term of incarceration or probation to the sentencingjudge in exchange for a guilty plea. Id. at 279-80. Sentence negotiation is the more
prevalent form of plea bargaining. Id. at 279.
46. Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 71; Brady, 397 U.S. at 752.
47. Richard Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel: The Im-
pact on Competent Representation and Proposals for Reform, 29 B.C. L. Rev. 531, 550(1988) ("Public defenders often use plea bargaining... [as] 'a necessary technique to
deal with an overwhelming caseload.' "). At least one study conducted in Michigan
concluded that court appointed counsel submitted guilty pleas for their clients more
than twice as frequently as privately retained counsel. Id. at 550-51 n.140.
48. See Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 71.
49. Carolyn E. Demarest, Plea Bargaining Can Often Protect the Victim, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 15, 1994, at A30.
50. Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 71; Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).
51. Eric Felten, Crime and Punishment: Disorder in the Court, Insight, Feb. 15,
1993, available in WESTLAW, 1993 WL 7511408, at *1-2; Scott & Stuntz, supra note
5, at 1909-10 n.4.
52. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1909 n.2; see also Gifford, supra note 38, at 66
("[D]efendants who plead guilty receive an average sentence of either probation or
992 [Vol. 64
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too lenient, many commentators believe the process undermines legis-
lative intent.53 These commentators argue that plea bargaining allows
prosecutors to circumvent sentencing statutes that fix the punishment
for certain crimes.-'
Another criticism of plea bargaining is that its sub rosa nature has
led to a decline of public confidence in the criminal justice system.55
Because plea bargaining takes place in private and is not open to pub-
lic scrutiny, the public is suspicious of the secretive nature of the pro-
cess.56 The public's confidence is further eroded because plea
bargaining circumvents the trial process.? Trials allow the public to
participate directly in the criminal justice process and the high visibil-
ity of criminal trials serves as a check on government oppression and
misconduct 5 8 The absence of trials deprives the public of the oppor-
tunity "to restore [a] sense of equilibrium to... communit[ies] de-
faced by... criminal act[s]."' 59
Removing criminal cases from the trial process through plea bar-
gaining also circumvents the "rigorous standards of due process and
proof imposed during trials."60 Plea bargaining permits the defend-
ant's fate to be determined without a full investigation, presentation
of testimony and evidence, and impartial fact finding.61 The absence
of these procedural safeguards presents a possibility that the prosecu-
tion will coerce innocent defendants into pleading guilty.62 The law
less than one year's imprisonment, while those convicted after trial received a typical
sentence of three or four years.").
53. See Gifford, supra note 38, at 66-70.
54. Id. at 68.
55. Id at 71.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 70. While the absence of trials can disrupt an entire community's sense
of equilibrium, crime victims are particularly affected. Trials have cathartic effects on
victims by providing outlets for feelings of retribution and the psychological need to
participate in the societal condemnation of a defendant. See id. at 72-73; see also Ma-
ria L. Imperial & Jeanne B. Mullgrav, The Convergence Benveen Illusion and Reality:
Lifting the Veil of Secrecy Around Childhood Sexual Abuse, 8 St. John's J. Legal Com-
ment. 135, 146 (1992) (discussing how civil actions further a victim's healing process
and allow society to publicly denounce unacceptable behavior).
60. Alissa Pollitz Worden, Policymaking By Prosecutors: The Uses of Discretion in
Regulating Plea Bargaining, 73 Judicature 335, 336 (1990).
61. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1912; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1043 (1968) (finding that it is not unethical
for a defense attorney to advise his client to plead guilty without first examining the
government's case).
62. Felten, supra note 51, at *2; see Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as
Compromise, 101 Yale L.. 1969, 1975 (1992). It is no surprise that innocent defend-
ants may buckle under the emotional strains of the criminal justice system. The crimi-
nal justice process has been known to destroy marriages and cause alienation or
emotional disturbance among a defendant's children. See Monroe L Freedman, Un-
derstanding Lawyers' Ethics 218 (1990). The financial burden of paying legal fees can
be tremendous, especially if a defendant has been fired from his job due to the stigma
1995]
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recognizes this possibility and allows courts to accept guilty pleas con-
taining protestations of innocence;63 an admission of guilt is not "a
constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty." 6
C. Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining
Both proponents and critics of plea bargaining agree that the prose-
cutor is the central and controlling figure in the plea bargaining pro-
cess.65 Because defendants do not have a constitutional right to plea
bargain,66 the decision whether to permit plea bargaiing in any par-
ticular case is solely a matter of prosecutorial discretion. 67 In exercis-
ing this discretion, prosecutors can refuse to plea bargain entirely,68 or
can set the terms and conditions on any offer made.69 This absolute
control over the plea bargaining process has led to characterizations
of the prosecutor as an "unregulated monopoly," capable of changing
at will the "going rate" for a particular category of crime.70 The reluc-
tance of courts to interfere in the process further buttresses the prose-
cutor's monopoly over plea bargaining.7' Courts presume that
prosecutors exercise their discretionary powers in good faith72 and re-
quire a strong showing of proof before inferring that a prosecutor has
associated with allegations of criminal activity or extended absenteeism because of
pretrial confinement. Md
63. North Carolina v. Afford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970).
64. Id.; Freedman, supra note 62, at 220-21 ("The law, in its even-handed majesty,
permits the innocent as well as the guilty to plead guilty in order to avoid the coercive
threat of extended imprisonment.").
65. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977) (stating that a prosecutor
need not plea bargain if he prefers to go to trial); United States v. Dockery, 965 F.2d
1112, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("The prosecutor generally is free to refuse to plea bar-
gain or, having made a plea offer, to withdraw it at any time."); People v. Harmon,
586 N.Y.S.2d 922, 925 (App. Div. 1992) ("The People ... may set the terms and
conditions of their consent to a guilty plea to a lesser charge."); Gifford, supra note
38, at 45 (noting that a prosecutor can refuse to plea bargain or set the terms and
conditions on any offer); Judge Burton B. Roberts, Remarks at the Alan Fortunoff
Criminal Justice Colloquium on Evaluating the Plea Bargaining Ban in Bronx County
(Oct. 25, 1993) ("No judge can take a lesser plea unless the District Attorney recom-
mends the lesser plea.").
66. See Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 561; Harmon, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 925.
67. See Dockery, 965 F.2d at 1116; People v. Cohen, 588 N.Y.S.2d 211, 212 (App.
Div. 1992); People v. Memminger, 469 N.Y.S.2d 323, 324 (Sup. Ct. 1983); W.J.
Michael Cody, Special Ethical Duties for Attorneys Who Hold Public Positions, 23
Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 453, 456 (1993).
68. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 561; Dockery, 965 F.2d at 1116.
69. Harmon, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 925.
70. Gifford, supra note 38, at 45.
71. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362-64 (1978) (holding that due
process is not violated when a prosecutor carries out a threat made during plea bar-
gaining); People v. Lofton, 366 N.Y.S.2d 769, 776-77 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (noting that the
remedy against a prosecutor who abuses his discretion is his removal from office or
the election of a successor, both of which are beyond the power of the court).
72. In re Delicati v. Schechter, 157 N.Y.S.2d 715, 721 (App. Div. 1956); Lofton,
366 N.Y.S.2d at 776; People v. Anonymous, 481 N.Y.S.2d 987, 991 (Crim. Ct. 1984).
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abused his discretion.73 This high standard of proof affords prosecu-
tors tremendous leeway in exercising their discretionary powers 74
D. The Limited Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion
Prosecutors' decisions are not immunized from judicial scrutiny.7S
Recognizing that prosecutorial discretion carries with it the potential
for "individual and institutional abuse,"76 appellate courts regularly
review defendants' claims of alleged abuse of prosecutorial discretion
during the plea bargaining process.
Most courts use one of two tests in reviewing claims of alleged
abuse of prosecutorial discretion. Claims of individual abuse of
prosecutorial discretion are reviewed under a motive test.77 The mo-
tive test examines a prosecutor's subjective reasons for acting against
a particular defendant.78 If the court determines that the prosecutor
had an improper motive for his actions, it will deem his otherwise au-
thorized behavior impermissible.79 The motive test, however, focuses
on the behavior of individual prosecutors, and thus is inadequate to
evaluate an institutional prosecutorial practice such as the Bronx plea
bargaining ban.'
In evaluating institutional practices which do not involve fundamen-
tal rights, courts employ a rational basis test.8 Under the rational
basis test, courts will uphold an institutional practice and not find an
abuse of discretion as long as some relationship exists between the
73. See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,297 (1987) ("Because discretion is essen-
tial to the criminal justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before
we would infer that the discretion has been abused.").
74. See Lofton, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 776 (stating that a prosecutor has wide latitude in
determining when and how to prosecute); see also In re Holtzman v. Goldman, 523
N.E.2d 297, 303 (N.Y. 1988) ("District Attorneys ... possess[ I broad discretion in
determining when ... [to prosecute.]"); People v. DiFalco, 377 N.E.2d 732,735 (N.Y.
1978) (commenting on prosecutor's broad discretion); The Prosecutor's Role, supra
note 4, at 105 (noting that courts have sanctioned the prosecutor's discretionary
powers).
75. State v. Freeland, 667 P.2d 509, 512 (Or. 1983) (en banc).
76. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978); Bennett L. Gershman, The
New Prosecutors, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 393, 408-09 (1992); Green, supra note 4, at 530
n.80.
77. William J. Genego, The New Adversary, 54 Brook. L Rev. 781, 840 (1988).
78. Id.
79. Id. For example, a prosecutor cannot use his charging authority to retaliate
against a defendant who exercises his right to trial. Id. Nor can a prosecutor sub-
poena a defendant's lawyer to testify merely to disqualify the lawyer from the case.
Id.; see Richard P. Adelstein, The Negotiated Guilty Plea.: A Framework for Analysis,
53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 783, 829 (1978) (examining a prosecutor's improper motives during
plea bargaining).
80. See Genego, supra note 77, at 841.
81. People v. Cohen, 588 N.Y.S.2d 211, 212 (App. Div. 1992); New York State
Soe'y of Enrolled Agents v. New York State Div. of Tax Appeals, 559 N.Y.S.2d 906,
910 (App. Div. 1990); People v. Elliby, 436 N.Y.S.2d 784, 786 (App. Div. 1981); Peo-
ple v. Robert Z., 511 N.Y.S2d 473, 476 (Civ. Ct. 1986); Dranzo v. Winterhalter, 577
A.2d 1349, 1355 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
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challenged practice and a legitimate state interest.' At least one New
York court employed the rational basis test to reject a challenge to a
plea bargaining practice similar to that in use in the Bronx.83 Thus,
according to current jurisprudence, the Bronx District Attorney did
not abuse his discretion in implementing a plea bargaining ban.
II. ORIGIN AND EFFEcrs OF THE PLEA BARGAINING BAN
This part examines the Bronx District Attorney's reasons for ban-
ning plea bargaining. This part also discusses the adverse and benefi-
cial effects the plea bargaining ban has had on the Bronx criminal
justice system.
A. The Origins of the Ban
Contending that "society [had] ceded control" of the criminal jus-
tice system to those accused of violating the law and that it was time
for the "system to take stock of itself,"84 the Bronx District Attorney
banned plea bargaining in all indicted felony cases.8 5 In addition to
causing the criminal justice system "to slow down, take a breather and
refocus,' 86 the Bronx District Attorney intended the ban to increase
the severity of punishment judges imposed on defendants by, in effect,
socializing judges into imposing harsher sentences acceptable to the
District Attorney.87 The District Attorney claimed that this socializa-
tion was necessary because judges' sentencing practices were responsi-
ble for a case backlog and the resulting disproportionate acquittal rate
in the Bronx.88 According to the District Attorney, judges in the
82. See Dranzo, 577 A.2d at 1355.
83. See Cohen, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 212. In Cohen, the defendant challenged the Dis-
trict Attorney's plea bargaining ban on equal protection grounds, arguing that his
rights were violated because defendants in other New York counties were still permit-
ted to plea bargain while he was prohibited from doing so. Id. Noting that neither a
fundamental right nor a suspect classification was involved, the court employed a ra-
tional basis test in analyzing the defendant's argument. Id. In rejecting the defend-
ant's argument, the court held that it was rational to have different plea bargaining
policies in different counties because prosecutorial caseloads and staffing varied
throughout the state. Id.
84. Next Six Weeks, supra note 29, at 2. Although Robert Johnson publicly stated
that he banned plea bargaining to reform the Bronx criminal justice system, a number
of newspapers reported that the District Attorney banned plea bargaining because he
was angered by a judge's decision to hold an evidentiary hearing over the prosecutor's
objections. See Problems Seen, supra note 18, at 5 (reporting that Robert Johnson
decided to end plea bargaining "out of pique" with a decision by a Supreme Court
judge to hold an evidentiary hearing over the prosecutor's objections); Policy Draws
Fire, supra note 26, at 23 (reporting that the Bronx District Attorney was motivated
by "pique" over the actions of one trial judge).
85. Mirsky, supra note 33, at 3.
86. Shaun Assael, Driving a Tough Bargain in the Bronx, N.Y. Newsday, Apr. 8,
1993, at 99.
87. See Mirsky, supra note 29, at 3, 5.
88. Id. at 4. The acquittal rate in the Bronx in November 1992-the month in
which the District Attorney implemented the ban-exceeded 40%. Id. at 5.
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Bronx created a disincentive to plead guilty by not adhering to a pol-
icy of sentence disparity.89 Because defendants had no incentive to
plead guilty in the absence of sentence disparity,90 their cases lan-
guished, created a backlog in the Bronx, and made it more difficult for
the prosecutor to obtain a conviction.91
In an effort to reverse this trend, the District Attorney banned plea
bargaining with indicted defendants and thereby eliminated a judge's
opportunity to impose a lesser sentence for a reduced charge.92
Under the new plea policy, judges are required by law to impose the
89. 1& at 4. Sentence disparity refers to the practice in which judges impose mark-
edly different sentences on defendants convicted following a trial, compared to de-
fendants convicted upon guilty pleas. For example, defendants A and B are charged
with first degree robbery, a class B felony carrying a maximum term of imprisonment
of twenty-five years upon conviction. See N.Y. Penal Law §§ 70.00(2)(b), 160.15 (Mc-
Kinney 1992). Defendant A believes that the state's case against him is weak, rejects
a plea bargaining offer by the prosecutor, and elects to proceed to trial. Defendant A
is convicted of first degree robbery after a trial and is sentenced to twenty-five years
in prison, the maximum term allowed by law. I § 70.00(2)(b). Defendant B, on the
other hand, feels that the state has a strong case against him and elects to plead guilty
to first degree robbery in exchange for a recommendation by the prosecutor to the
sentencing judge that the defendant be sentenced to nine years in prison. See N.Y.
Crim. Proc. Law § 220.50(5) (McKinney 1992) (requiring that the agreed upon sen-
tence be made "orally on the record, or in writing filed with the court" as a condition
of the plea bargain). The court accepts the prosecutor's recommendation and
sentences defendant B to a maximum term of imprisonment of nine years. In this
example, the court adhered to a policy of sentence disparity by sentencing the defend-
ant who pled guilty to a much shorter term of imprisonment than the defendant who
elected to have his guilt determined following a trial. The defendant who pleads
guilty and saves the prosecutor and the court valuable resources by allowing them to
dispose of a case quickly and efficiently is thus rewarded with a less severe sentence.
According to the Bronx District Attorney, a policy of sentence disparity induces de-
fendants to plead guilty to avoid the more severe sentences that are imposed follow-
ing a conviction after a trial. See Mlrsky, supra note 33, at 4.
90. In the absence of sentence disparity, defendants have no incentive to plead
guilty because they receive the same sentence regardless of whether they are con-
victed upon a plea of guilty or after a trial. See supra note 89.
91. It is axiomatic that the longer a case languishes, the more difficult it is for a
prosecutor to obtain a conviction. With the passage of time, witnesses may die or
disappear, memories may fade, evidence may disappear or be inadvertently de-
stroyed, needed trial resources may become scarcer, and statutory speedy trial provi-
sions may mandate that the charges against a defendant be dismissed. See Anthony
M. DeStefano, Letting 'Em Go in the Bronx, N.Y. Newsday, Sept. 23, 1993, at 36, 36
("The longer cases stay around, the more chance there is of [a] witness becoming
unavailable, the more chance there is of a witness becoming intimidated and the more
chance there is of a witness' recollection becoming dimmed." (quoting Bronx Admin-
istrative Judge Burton B. Roberts)); Mirsky, supra note 33, at 6 ("[Als cases age, the
ability to prosecute successfully is reduced. .. ").
92. In New York State, the consent of both the prosecutor and the court is re-
quired before a defendant is permitted to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser included
offense. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 220.10(3)-(4) (McKinney 1992). In the absence
of the prosecutor's consent, a defendant may plead guilty as a matter of right only to
the entire indictment. Id. § 220.10(2); see also supra notes 18-22 and accompanying
text.
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mandatory minimum sentence 93 under the highest count of the indict-
ment. 4 The District Attorney surmised that judges faced with the
plea bargaining ban would be forced to revive sentence disparity
rather than risk a greater backlog of pending cases and an increase in
the number of trials.95 This situation, in turn, would create an incen-
tive to plea bargain and allow plea bargaining to return to the
Bronx.96
B. The Effects of the Ban
The plea bargaining ban has not had its intended effect of reforming
the sentencing practices of Bronx judges. Under the ban, Bronx
judges have become more lenient and appear to be imposing shorter
sentences on the highest counts of indictments. 7 According to the
Bronx District Attorney's theory,9 8 this additional leniency should re-
sult in a further disincentive to plea bargain and an increase in the
backlog of cases. Indeed, since the imposition of the ban, guilty pleas
have decreased by eleven percent, 99 and the backlog of pending cases
in the Bronx has increased by twenty-four percent. 100 As a direct re-
sult of the increase in the backlog of pending cases, the average time
defendants remain in custody has also increased. Since the imposition
of the ban, Bronx defendants average in excess of 160 days in custody,
compared to the 120 day average for other New York City bor-
oughs.101 There has also been a forty-seven percent increase in the
number of Bronx defendants incarcerated for over one year.'02 These
additional days of incarceration cost New York City taxpayers three to
four million dollars annually. 3
The increase in the average time defendants remain in pre-trial cus-
tody has also had a substantial effect on the dismissal rate in the
93. Judges are required under New York State law to impose mandatory minimum
sentences on defendants convicted of certain classes of crimes. See N.Y. Penal Law
§§ 70.00(3)(a)-(b), 70.02(4), 70.04(4), 70.06(4)(a)-(b), 70.08(3)(a)-(c) (McKinney
1992).
94. Mirsky, supra note 33, at 3.
95. Id. at 4.
96. Id. at 4-5.
97. Richard H. Girgenti, Remarks at the Alan Fortunoff Criminal Justice Collo-
quium on Evaluating the Plea Bargaining Ban in Bronx County, (Oct. 25, 1993)("Bronx County judges [have been] more lenient [since] the policy went into effect.").
98. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
99. Mirsky, supra note 33, at 9.
100. Plea Bargains Expedite Our System of Justice, supra note 33, at C2; Mirsky,
supra note 33, at 8.
101. Mirsky, supra note 33, at 11; cf. Girgenti, supra note 97 ("The average days of
incarceration [for defendants] increased overall but the average time for violent felo-
nies has decreased.").
102. Mirsky, supra note 33, at 11.
103. Roberts, supra note 65 (stating that New York City will have to spend an addi-
tional three to four million dollars on incarceration because of the Bronx plea bar-
gaining ban).
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Bronx. Dismissals have increased twenty-one percent since the prohi-
bition of plea bargaining in the New York Supreme Court.1°4 Pres-
ently, one out of every ten criminal cases filed in the Bronx is
dismissed.1 5 This marked increase is primarily attributed to two fac-
tors: (1) the weakening of the prosecutor's case with the passage of
time;1° and (2) constitutional and statutory speedy trial provisions."
More troubling than the rise in the dismissal rate and the concomi-
tant threat posed to society by the release of potentially guilty defend-
ants is the probability that innocent defendants are being convicted
because of the Bronx ban.'0 This probability results from a combina-
tion of three factors. First, under the new plea policy, defendants
must usually decide within six days, before they are indicted, whether
to accept a prosecutor's offer and plead guilty.1°9 This time limit
places tremendous pressure on a defendant who, from a jail cell, must
attempt to contact and consult with family and counsel before making
a decision that could affect him for the rest of his life. Furthermore,
not only must a defendant make this crucial decision within a few
days, he must do so without the benefit of necessary information to
assist him. 10 Finally, because innocent defendants are highly risk
104. firsky, supra note 33, at 10; see also Girgenti, supra note 97 ("We do see the
percentage of disposed indicted dismissals has increased.").
105. Mlrsky, supra note 33, at 10.
106. See supra note 91.
107. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees defendants the right to a
speedy trial. See U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV. This guarantee is codified at N.Y.
Crim. Proc. Law §§ 30.20,30.30 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1995). The New York State
speedy trial provisions provide that a defendant's motion to dismiss a criminal prose-
cution must be granted where the People are not ready for trial within a certain
amount of time. Id. § 30.30(1)(a)-(d).
108. Lynch, supra note 33 ("I think there are some innocent people taking pleas as
a result of pressure from the [Bronx] system.").
109. This six-day window of opportunity to plead guilty is based on N.Y. Crim.
Proc. Law § 180.80, which requires that defendants held in custody on felony com-
plaints be given a preliminary hearing within 144 hours (six days) to determine if
reasonable cause exists to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged.
See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 180.80 (McKinney 1992). Because New York City prose-
cutors do not have the resources to conduct thousands of preliminary hearings every
year, they circumvent the hearing requirement by having defendants indicted. New
York State law does not require preliminary hearings for defendants who have been
indicted. Id. § 180.80(2)(a)-(b). Indictments are normally not filed by the Grand Jury
until the sixth day, and thus a defendant usually has up to six days to engage in plea
bargaining while the New York City Criminal Court still has jurisdiction over his case.
Id. § 10.30(1)(a)-(b), (2). Once an indictment is filed, however, the New York
Supreme Court acquires jurisdiction of the case. Id. §§ 10.20(1)(a), 210.10. At this
point, plea bargaining is no longer permitted.
110. See Lynch, supra note 33 ("The Legal Aid Society has no information other
than what the District Attorney gives them. We don't have any police reports by the
[N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 1 180.80 day. We have nothing."); A Plea for Better Justice in
the Bronx-The DA's Plan Is No Bargain, N.Y. Newsday, July 29, 1993, at 54 ("It's
especially tough [for a person to consider a plea] when police reports, medical records
and the like are unavailable."). Indicted defendants in New York State are not pro-
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averse,"' they will likely succumb to the pressure of making a rushed
decision without adequate information. These defendants will often
conclude that their interests are best served by pleading guilty, ac-
cepting the certainty of a lesser punishment, and avoiding the risk of a
longer period of incarceration.1 2
While more innocent defendants will be pressured into pleading
guilty because of the Bronx ban, others will continue to maintain their
innocence and proceed to trial. Innocent defendants have strong rea-
sons for going to trial because they have a greater chance of suc-
cess." 3 Nonetheless, "convicting innocents [after a trial would] likely
be easier in a no-bargaining world" 1 4 because of deterioration in the
trial process caused by the plea bargaining ban. To compensate for
the additional requests for trials 1 5 without a corresponding increase
in resources," 6 the trial process in the Bronx will become more "cas-
ual.""' 7 The relaxation of the trial process will result in higher error
rates and in a greater number of innocent defendants being con-
vided with detailed information concerning the charges against them until they make
specific written requests or file motions. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 200.95(1),(3),
240.20(1)(a)-(j), 240.80(1), 240.90(2), 255.20(1)-(2) (McKinney 1992). These requests
and motions cannot be made or filed until after a defendant has been arraigned on the
indictment. I& §§ 200.95(3), 240.80(1), 240.90(2), 255.20(1). Thus, a defendant will
usually not be provided with detailed information about the charges against him until
weeks after he has been arraigned in Supreme Court.
111. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1943 (noting that innocent defendants are
less prone to take risks than guilty defendants). As a class, criminal defendants are
usually prone to take risks. Id. A criminal history strongly suggests that the defendant
is willing to take risks and fears punishment less than most people. Id. "But risk
aversion is a much more plausible assumption where innocent defendants are con-
cerned. .. ." Id.
112. See Gifford, supra note 38, at 58-59; see also Felten, supra note 51, at *2
("Under pressure to cop a plea, innocent people may opt for punishment, deciding
that the time, expense and risk of going to trial is too great.").
113. See Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 1969-70.
114. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1933.
115. It can be assumed that in the absence of plea bargaining in the Bronx, an
increased number of defendants will exercise their constitutional right to trial. In at
least one jurisdiction where plea bargaining was banned, El Paso County, Texas, the
proportion of cases disposed of by trial doubled following the implementation of the
ban. See Weninger, supra note 6, at 276-77.
116. The Bronx criminal justice system's budget would need to double to pay for
the costs of additional trials if plea bargaining was reduced by only 10 percentage
points-from 85% to 75%. See Felten, supra note 51, at *7. Unfortunately, the New
York City criminal justice system is already broke, as is evidenced by the condition of
facilities. Id; see also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 Harv.
L. Rev. 1037, 1040 (1984) ("A reduction from 90 per cent to 80 per cent in guilty pleas
requires the assignment of twice the judicial manpower and facilities.... ." (quoting
Chief Justice Burger)).
117. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1916 ("If plea bargaining were abolished-if,
that is, the system had to process many more cases by trial than it presently does-
one might reasonably suppose that the trial process would be more casual than it is
now."). To accommodate a substantial increase in trials without additional resources,
the trial process would also have to be "truncated." Id. at 1950. Shortening the trial
process would also increase the error rate. Id.; see also National Prosecution Stan-
1000 [Vol. 64
PLEA BARGAINING
victed." 8t Thus, regardless of the means of obtaining a conviction-by
guilty plea or trial-innocent defendants will have a greater chance of
being convicted under the new ban.
Another adverse effect of the plea bargaining ban is the erosion of a
defendant's constitutional right to be prosecuted by indictment.11 9
The New York State Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be
held to answer for... [an] infamous crime... unless on indictment of
a grand jury."' 2 This constitutional guarantee is aimed at preventing
potentially oppressive prosecutorial behavior by requiring that, before
an individual is publicly accused of a crime, the state must convince a
grand jury that sufficient evidence exists for it to believe that the ac-
cused is guilty.' 21 This important constitutional right has eroded due
to the tremendous increase in the use of Superior Court Informations
("SC").
The SCI is essentially a waiver of indictment by a defendant that
permits the prosecutor to forego the grand jury process and proceed
in the New York Supreme Court on the basis of a written accusation
drafted by the prosecutor. 22 While the legislature hoped that the use
of SCIs would result in "speedier and equally fair dispositions" for
defendants, 23 it did not intend to eliminate the grand jury process and
its inherent protections." The right to be prosecuted by indictment is
so vital to our criminal justice system that a defendant can only waive
the right in open court in the presence of an attorney. 12s Even then, a
defendant's waiver is subject to approval by the court."2
Prior to the imposition of the plea bargaining ban, approximately
twenty-five percent of the cases filed in the Bronx were disposed of by
defendants pleading guilty to reduced felony charges in SCIs. 2 7 The
ban has resulted in a sixty percent increase in the use of SCIs.12 Now,
dards, supra note 36, at 223 (noting that an increased reliance on trials would lower
the quality of justice administered).
118. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1932-33.
119. This Note posits that the grand jury process affords defendants valuable con-
stitutional protections. Courts and commentators, however, have been highly critical
of the grand jury process. See People v. Carter, 566 N.E.2d 119, 124 (N.Y. 1990)
(Titone, J., dissenting) (repeating former Chief Judge Sol Wachtler's criticism that the
grand jury would indict a ham sandwich); Ronald F. Wright, Why Not Administrative
Grand Juries?, 44 Admin. L. Rev. 465, 514 (1992) (describing the grand jury as a
rubber stamp and not a valid protector of liberty).
120. N.Y. Const. art. 1, § 6.
121. People v. Ford, 465 N.E.2d 322, 325-26 (N.Y. 1984); People v. Iannone, 384
N.E.2d 656, 660 (N.Y. 1978).
122. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 200.15 (McKinney 1992); People v. Burke, 432
N.Y.S.2d 832, 832-33 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
123. Burke, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
124. See N.Y. Const. art. 1, § 6; N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 195.20(a) (McKinney 1992).
125. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 195.20 (McKinney 1992).
126. Id. § 195.30.
127. Mirsky, supra note 33, at graph TIM1.XLC.
128. Id.
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forty percent of Bronx cases are disposed of with SCIs. 12 9 The dra-
matic increase in the use of SCIs indicates that the locus of plea bar-
gaining in the Bronx has moved away from the New York Supreme
Court to the New York City Criminal Court. 130 Recognizing this, de-
fendants are pressured into waiving the constitutional protections of
the grand jury process and agreeing to be prosecuted by SCI to avoid
the strict no bargaining policy that applies to indicted defendants.' 3 '
An examination of two hypothetical defendants, A and B, charged
with murder in the second degree reveals why increasing numbers of
Bronx defendants are electing to be prosecuted by SCI to circumvent
the plea bargaining ban. In New York, second degree murder is a
class A-I felony,132 carrying a minimum indeterminate 133 sentence of
fifteen years' 14 to life imprisonment 35 and a maximum indeterminate
sentence of twenty-five years 36 to life imprisonment 37 upon
conviction.
Defendant A is arraigned on a felony complaint charging second
degree murder and elects not to plead guilty because she feels that the
state's case against her is weak. Defendant A is subsequently indicted
for second degree murder. Under the Bronx plea bargaining ban,
once defendant A is indicted she must plead guilty to the highest
129. Id.
130. Id. at 9. The New York City Criminal Court is the forum in which defendants
are usually arraigned on criminal complaints or prosecuted on misdemeanors. See
N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 10.30(1)(a)-(b), (2) (McKinney 1992). Once the grand jury
indicts a defendant on a felony offense, however, the New York City Criminal Court
transfers jurisdiction of the case to the Supreme Court. See id. §§ 10.20(1)(a), 210.10.
131. The ability of defendants to circumvent the ban by pleading guilty to SCIs led
Bronx Administrative Judge Burton Roberts to declare that the "[no plea bargaining]
policy is as phony as a three-dollar bill. It's a bunch of smoke and mirrors." See Rob-
erts, supra note 65; see also supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
132. N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25 (McKinney 1992).
133. New York law provides for the imposition of two types of sentences upon de-
fendants convicted of a criminal offense-indeterminate sentences and definite
sentences. N.Y. Penal Law § 70.00(1), (4) (McKinney 1992). With indeterminate
sentences, the length of imprisonment "is not fixed by the court but is left to the
determination of penal authorities within minimum and maximum time limits fixed by
the court of law." Black's Law Dictionary 771 (6th ed. 1990). For example, a defend-
ant sentenced to an indeterminate term of 5 to 15 years imprisonment must serve at
least 5 years in prison and cannot serve in excess of 15 years. Penal authorities, how-
ever, can release the defendant on parole as a reward for exemplary behavior anytime
after he has served 5 years. Penal authorities can also penalize a recalcitrant defend-
ant who habitually violates prison rules by holding him in prison for up to 15 years.
With definite or determinate sentences, the length of imprisonment is specified by the
court and penal authorities have no discretion in deciding when to release the defend-
ant. Id. at 450. For example, a defendant sentenced to two years in prison would have
to be released by penal authorities after serving two years.
134. N.Y. Penal Law § 70.00(3)(a)(i) (McKinney 1992).
135. Id. § 70.00(2)(a).
136. Id. § 70.00(3)(a)(i).
137. Id. § 70.00(2)(a).
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count of the indictment,' second degree murder, or attempt to vindi-
cate herself at trial. If defendant A decides to plead guilty, the court
must impose an indeterminate sentence with a minimum term of at
least fifteen years139 and a maximum term of life imprisonment. 40 If
defendant A refuses to plead guilty, elects to proceed to trial and is
convicted, she will be subject to an indeterminate sentence with a min-
imum term of as much as twenty-five years' 4' and a maximum term of
life imprisonment. 42
Defendant B, like defendant A, is also arraigned on a felony com-
plaint charging second degree murder. Defendant B, however, feels
that the state's case against her is strong and attempts to circumvent
the Bronx plea bargaining ban by waiving her right to be prosecuted
by indictment and consenting to be prosecuted by SCI. 43 Because the
plea bargaining ban only applies to indicted defendants and defendant
B is being prosecuted by SCI, 4" defendant B will still be permitted to
plea bargain. Under this scenario, the District Attorney offers to al-
low defendant B to plead guilty to a reduced charge, second degree
manslaughter, a class C felony.'4 If defendant B consents and pleads
guilty, her potential exposure to imprisonment will be greatly reduced
because the permissible sentence for a class C felony conviction
ranges from a definite term of one year in prison to an indeterminate
term of five to fifteen years imprisonment. 4 6 Thus, by waiving her
right to be prosecuted by indictment and consenting to be prosecuted
by SCI, defendant B circumvented the Bronx ban and secured a plea
bargain offer from the District Attorney that guarantees that the mini-
mum and maximum terms of imprisonment to which she would be
subject are well below that of her counterpart, defendant A.
While the plea bargaining ban has severely impacted the Bronx
criminal justice system, not all of its effects have been adverse. As a
result of the ban, the Bronx is now the New York City borough with
the highest percentage of defendants convicted on the highest count
of indictments charging felonies.147 The Bronx also boasts a dramatic
increase in the number of people convicted of low level drug of-
fenses. 48 Overall, however, these positive effects are greatly out-
138. See supra notes 18-22, 93-94 and accompanying text.
139. N.Y. Penal Law § 70.00(3)(a)(i) (McKinney 1992).
140. Id- § 70.00(2)(a).
141. Id. § 70.00(3)(a)(i).
142. I& § 70.00(2)(a).
143. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 18-22, 92 and accompanying text.
145. N.Y. Penal Law § 125.15 (McKinney 1992).
146. Id. § 70.00(2)(c), (3)(b), (4).
147. Girgenti, supra note 97 ("Bronx County convicted the highest percentage of
defendants charged with [class] B, C, D, and E felonies-the top count that is.").
148. Id. ("With low level drug offenses there has been a dramatic increase of people
convicted of the top count that they were indicted for.").
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weighed by the adverse effects of the ban, resulting in a deterioration
of the quality of justice in the Bronx.
III. AN EXAMINATION OF THE EFFEcrs OF THE BAN UNDER
ETHics RULES
While the Bronx District Attorney's exercise of discretion in impos-
ing a plea bargaining ban appears to pass judicial muster, 14 9 his behav-
ior still raises serious ethical questions. 150 Behavior that is legal can
nonetheless be unethical. 151 Prosecutors, like all members of the bar,
must conform their behavior to the professional rules of ethics.15 The
149. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
150. This Note will examine the Bronx District Attorney's behavior under the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1981) [hereinafter Model Code], the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1983) [hereinafter Model Rules], the New
York Code of Professional Responsibility (1990) [hereinafter N.Y. Code], and the
ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice (1992) [hereinaf-
ter Standards for Criminal Justice]. While this Note will examine the Bronx District
Attorney's behavior under all of the above provisions, only the N.Y. Code has been
adopted in New York and can serve as the basis of a disciplinary action against the
Bronx District Attorney. Both the Model Code and the N.Y. Code employ the desig-
nations Disciplinary Rules ("DR"), Ethical Considerations ("EC"), and Canons.
Their purposes are as follows:
The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms
the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relation-
ships with the public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession.
They embody the general concepts from which the Ethical Considerations
and the Disciplinary Rules are derived.
The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the
objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive ....
The Disciplinary Rules ... are mandatory in character. [They] state the
minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being sub-ject to disciplinary action.
Model Code, supra, Preliminary Statement, N.Y. Code, supra, Preliminary Statement.
The Standards for Criminal Justice are intended as a guide to professional conduct
and in New York cannot serve as the basis for disciplinary action against a prosecutor.
See Standards for Criminal Justice, supra, Standard 3-1.1.
151. See United States v. Babb, 807 F.2d 272,279 (1st Cir. 1986) (upholding defend-
ant's conviction despite unprofessional conduct of prosecutor "worthy of severe con-
demnation"); United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1174 (2d Cir. 1981) (per
curiam) (affirming conviction despite unprofessional conduct of prosecutor), cert. de-
nied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982); cf. Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic of
Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 493, 506 (1989) ("[Behavior that] appears strategically
sound during the course of bargaining may not be ethically... appropriate.").
152. See Raphael v. Shapiro, 587 N.Y.S.2d 68, 70 (Sup. Ct. 1992) ("The integrity of
our legal system and the fair administration of justice mandates [sic] strict adherence
to the Code of Professional Responsibility by all members of the Bar."); Grunberg v.
Feller, 505 N.Y.S.2d 515, 517 (Civ. Ct. 1986) ("Every attorney admitted to the Bar
must strictly follow and subscribe to the provisions of the Code of Professional Ethics
." (citations omitted)); see also Cody, supra note 67, at 464 (noting that
"[a]ttorneys in government service are bound by two sets of ethics"-ethical princi-
ples governing public officials and the codes of ethics for attorneys). Every state ex-
cept California has adopted either the Model Rules or the Model Code with some
minor variation to govern the conduct of attorneys. See Thomas D. Morgan & Ronald
D. Rotunda, 1993 Selected Standards on Professional Responsibility 127-32 (1993).
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role of prosecutors significantly differs from that of other attorneys,153
however, and a number of particularized ethics rules govern their be-
havior.'- 4 These particularized rules provide guidance in determining
whether the Bronx District Attorney abused his discretion and acted
unethically in implementing a plea bargaining ban.
A. The Bronx District Attorney's Duty to "Seek Justice"
Foremost among the special ethics rules governing the Bronx Dis-
trict Attorney's conduct is N.Y. Code EC 7-13, which states that pros-
ecutors have a "duty to seek justice [and] not merely to convict."1155 In
seeking justice, the prosecutor performs an "oversight function"15 6
and must be mindful of his responsibilities to the community, victim,
defendant, and state. 57 The prosecutor must protect the community,
quench the victim's desire for vengeance, safeguard the defendant's
rights, and ensure that the state has a fair and efficient criminal justice
system. 58 An examination of the effects of the Bronx plea bargaining
ban suggests that the District Attorney may have neglected his obliga-
tion to certain constituencies.
While the community and victims are applauding the plea bargain-
ing ban because felons are being increasingly convicted on the highest
counts of indictments,'159 defendants are lamenting its effects. The ban
has not only resulted in a substantial increase in the average length of
defendants' pre-trial detention,16° but has also heightened the possi-
California developed its own specific code: California Business and Professions Code.
IL at 300-25.
153. The role of the prosecutor differs from that of an attorney representing an
individual in a number of ways. First, a prosecutor represents a powerful sovereignty
and not an ordinary party in a controversy. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935). Second, "Itihe prosecutor's freedom from client control gives rise to vast dis-
cretion in making decisions." Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring tie Ethics of
Prosecutorial Trial Practice" Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 Vand. L Rev. 45, 58
(1991). The attorney representing an individual client is required to consult with the
client concerning decisions. See, e.g., Model Rules, supra note 150, Rule 1.4(a)-(b)
(requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed to permit the client to make
informed decisions). Third, the prosecutor simultaneously represents the often con-
flicting interests of the community, victim, defendant, and the state. See Zacharias,
supra, at 57-59. The attorney representing an individual is normally prohibited from
representing conflicting interests. See Model Code, supra note 150, DR 5-105(A)-(B);
Model Rules, supra note 150, Rule 1.7(a)-(b).
154. See Cody, supra note 67, at 456; Freedman, supra note 62, at 213.
155. N.Y. Code, supra note 150, EC 7-13; Model Code, supra note 150, EC 7-13; see
Berger 295 U.S. at 88; People v. Brown, 412 N.Y.S.2d 522, 525 (App. Div. 1979);
Model Rules, supra note 150, Rule 3.8 cmt.; Standards for Criminal Justice, supra note
150, Standard 3-1.2(c).
156. Zacharias, supra note 153, at 110.
157. Id. at 57; see also N.Y. Code, supra note 150, EC 7-13(2) (stating that deci-
sions made by the prosecutor affecting the public interest should be fair to all).
158. Zacharias, supra note 153, at 57.
159. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
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bility that innocent defendants are being unjustly convicted. 161 Addi-
tionally, the increased reliance on SCIs as a means of prosecution
deprives defendants of the constitutional protections afforded by the
grand jury process. 62
The state also suffers as a result of the Bronx District Attorney's
failure to maintain a fair and efficient criminal justice system. The
large increase in the backlog of pending cases 163 and the number of
dismissals'" undermines the efficiency of the system. Further, a sys-
tem that convicts innocent defendants 65 and holds others in lengthy
pre-trial detention 6 6 leads the public to question its fairness. In sum,
the effects of the Bronx ban strongly suggest that the District Attor-
ney is failing to seek justice for segments of society that he is responsi-
ble for representing.
Nonetheless, the effects of the Bronx ban alone are insufficient to
substantiate a finding that the District Attorney is acting unethically
by failing to seek justice. First, the duty to seek justice standard is too
nebulous to be enforceable. 67 In fact, no prosecutor has ever re-
ceived a disciplinary sanction for failing to comply with the duty to
seek justice standard.168 Instead, if the Bronx District Attorney was
faced with disciplinary action for failing to seek justice based on his
plea bargaining ban, he would probably be charged under a New York
disciplinary rule prohibiting "[e]ngag[ing] in conduct that is prejudi-
cial to the administration of justice.' 1 69 While some of the ban's ef-
fects have clearly prejudiced the administration of justice in the
Bronx,170 the prejudicial standard is also nebulous' 71 and provides no
parameters by which to judge behavior. Thus, this standard would
most likely not support a finding that the Bronx District Attorney ac-
ted unethically. 172
161. See supra notes 108-18 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 119-29 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 108-18 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
167. See Gershman, supra note 76, at 445; see also Zacharias, supra note 153, at 48
("The 'do justice' standard... establishes no identifiable norm.").
168. Zacharias, supra note 153, at 105. In New York, the seek justice standard could
not form the basis of a disciplinary action because it is an ethical consideration which
is aspirational in nature. See supra note 150.
169. N.Y. Code, supra note 150, DR 1-102(A)(5); see also Model Code, supra note
150, DR 1-102(A)(5) ("A lawyer shall not: Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to
the administration of justice."); Model Rules, supra note 150, Rule 8.4(d) ("It is pro-
fessional misconduct for a lawyer to: Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice .... ").
170. See supra notes 97-131 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., H. Richard Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical
Standard. Guidance from the ABA, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 1145, 1153 (1973) (stating that
"justice in the criminal process ... [is] a matter of myth").
172. An exhaustive search failed to discover a single instance in which a prosecutor
was sanctioned for engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
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Although the District Attorney must seek justice and refrain from
engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, these
two standards alone do not guide his behavior. In exercising his dis-
cretionary powers, the Bronx District Attorney must also attempt to
discern the needs of the public and must avoid being guided by im-
proper motivation.17 3 The District Attorney should have banned plea
bargaining only if he "conscientiously believe[d it] to be in the public
interest."' 74 Accordingly, if the Bronx District Attorney "conscien-
tiously believe[d]" that a ban on plea bargaining would reform sen-
tencing practices and benefit the criminal justice system,175 his
decision was well within ethical bounds. If, however, the Bronx Dis-
trict Attorney banned plea bargaining because of his personal dissatis-
faction with a specific judge's ruling, as a number of newspapers have
reported, 76 his behavior was unethical. 7
B. The Prosecutor's Duty to Identify and Correct Deficiencies in
the Criminal Justice System
As a key player in the criminal justice system, the Bronx District
Attorney also has an ethical duty to "recognize deficiencies in the
legal system and to initiate corrective measures therein. '"178 This ethi-
cal obligation to innovate179 imposes a duty on the Bronx District At-
The only discovered disciplinary sanction of a prosecutor in relation to plea bargain-
ing dated back to 1914. See Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Disciplinary Action
Against Attorney for Misconduct Related to Performance of Official Duties as Prose-
cuting Attorney, 10 A.L.R.4th 605, 630 (1981) (discussing a one-year suspension of a
prosecutor for inducing three young boys who proclaimed their innocence into plead-
ing guilty).
173. See Uviller, supra, note 171, at 1152-53; see also Norton, supra note 151, at 531
("The purpose of ethics... is to curb excessive self-interest and to encourage regard
for the rights of others.").
174. N.Y. Code, supra note 150, EC 8-4; Model Code, supra note 150, EC 8-4.
175. See supra notes 84-96 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 84.
177. See N.Y. Code, supra note 150, DR 5-101(A), EC 5-1; Model Code, supra note
150, DR 5-101(A), EC 5-1 (requiring an attorney to exercise independent profes-
sional judgment on behalf of a client and not to be influenced by personal interests or
desires); see also Model Rules, supra, note 150, Rule 1.7 cmt. [6] ("The lawyer's own
interests should not be permitted to have adverse effect on representation of a
client.").
178. N.Y. Code, supra note 150, EC 8-1; Model Code, supra note 150, EC 8-1; see
also Model Rules, supra note 150, pmbL [5] ("A lawyer should be mindful of deficien-
cies in the administration of justice.. . ."); Standards for Criminal Justice, supra note
150, Standard 3-1.2(d) ("It is an important function of the prosecutor to seek to re-
form and improve the administration of criminal justice."). But cf. Cowles v. Brown-
ell, 538 N.E.2d 325, 327 (N.Y. 1989) (stating that a prosecutor's duty is to represent
the people and not to insulate the criminal justice system from civil liability).
179. Richard L Kuh, Professional Responsibility of the Lawyer in Government Ser-
vice, Remarks at the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Jan. 28, 1975), in
Professional Responsibility of the Lawyer The Murky Divide Between Right and
Wrong 93, 105 (1976) ("I am talking about an ethical obligation of the lawyer in gov-
ernment to rock the boat, to innovate, to improve.").
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torney to encourage and aid in making needed changes in the legal
system.180 Arguably, the Bronx District Attorney was implementing
needed changes when he banned plea bargaining. First, restrictive
plea bargaining policies are associated with efforts to crack down on
crime by refusing to offer lenient sentences.' 8 In a borough that has
sixteen percent of New York City's population yet twenty-five percent
of its homicides, twenty-two percent of its drug arrests, and twenty
percent of its rapes,"S the public may perceive the plea bargaining
ban as a welcome and needed change to combat the disproportionate
amount of crime in the Bronx.8 3 The public may also perceive the
Bronx ban as an innovative attempt to secure desperately needed ad-
ditional courtrooms and judges from the state. 84 While some may
view the Bronx ban as an innovative corrective measure designed to
improve the legal system, others perceive it as a death knell for crimi-
nal justice in the Bronx.' 85 The plea bargaining ban has not only in-
creased the backlog of pending cases' 86 and the number of
dismissals,"a7 but has also forced defendants to remain in pre-trial de-
tention longer' 88 and has cost the state millions of extra dollars. 89 In
light of these results,190 there is support for the proposition that the
180. See N.Y. Code, supra note 150, EC 8-9; Model Code, supra note 150, EC 8-9.
Both the N.Y. Code and the Model Code provide that "t]he advancement of our
legal system is of vital importance in maintaining the rule of law and in facilitating
orderly changes; therefore, lawyers should encourage, and should aid in making,
needed changes and improvements." N.Y. Code, supra note 150, EC 8-9; Model
Code, supra note 150, EC 8-9; see also Standards for Criminal Justice, supra note 150,
Standard 3-1.2(d) ("When inadequacies or injustices in the substantive or procedural
law come to the prosecutor's attention, he or she should stimulate efforts for remedial
action."); Cody, supra note 67, at 456 (stating that the prosecutor's duty extends be-
yond merely seeking convictions).
181. See Worden, supra note 60, at 340.
182. Kanner, supra note 24, at 48.
183. See Bertram R. Gelfand, Pleas Are No Bargain, N.Y. Newsday, Mar. 3, 1993,
at 86, 86.
184. See Assael, supra note 86, at 99 ("'If we continue to plea-bargain because the
system is crowded, we won't address the real issue: getting more courtrooms and
judges."' (quoting Bronx District Attorney Robert Johnson)). One effect of the El
Paso County plea bargaining ban was a greatly expanded and restructured court sys-
tem to counteract the adverse effects of the ban. See Weninger, supra note 6, at 305-
06.
185. See Next Six Weeks, supra note 29, at 2 ("[I]f the policy of no plea bargaining
... remains in effect, '[a]fter the new year, we'll begin to die a slow death.'" (quoting
Justice Eggert, Acting Bronx County Administrative Judge)).
186. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
190. A study of other plea bargaining bans would have alerted the Bronx District
Attorney to the adverse effects associated with such bans. For instance, following a
ban on plea bargaining in El Paso, Texas, the number of requests for trials doubled,
resulting in a 250% increase in the number of pending cases. See Weninger, supra
note 6. at 277-78. The increase in pending cases delayed the start of the average trial
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Bronx District Attorney is impairing the quality of justice rather than
fulfilling his ethical obligation to improve the legal system.
C. The Bronx District Attorney Did Not Violate Ethics Rules
Unquestionably, the plea bargaining ban has adversely affected the
Bronx criminal justice system. The adverse effects of the ban, how-
ever, are not enough to substantiate a finding that the Bronx District
Attorney acted unethically by abusing his discretion. First, the nebu-
lous standards governing the Bronx District Attorney's behavior
make it nearly impossible to define exactly what constitutes unethical
behavior in these circumstances.' 9' Second, many ethics rules are
couched in subjective terms, 92 providing the Bronx District Attorney
with tremendous leeway to decide what is right and wrong.193 More-
over, absent an admission by the District Attorney, this subjectivity
makes it impossible to ascertain whether or not he was improperly
motivated, and thus acting unethically,'9 in banning plea bargaining.
Third, the adverse effects of the Bronx ban cannot be viewed in isola-
tion. The ban has resulted in a number of positive changes in the
Bronx,195 suggesting that the District Attorney exercised "sound dis-
cretion"'19 in his attempt to change a system in dire need of reform.
In sum, the vague, subjective ethical standards governing a prosecu-
tor's behavior and the mixed effects of the Bronx ban do not support a
conclusion that the District Attorney abused his discretion and acted
unethically in implementing a plea bargaining ban.
IV. MODIFYING THE BRONX BAN
An examination of the effects of the Bronx ban under existing case
law and ethics rules does not support a conclusion that the District
by one hundred days. Id. at 305 tbl. 5. As a result, incarcerated defendants were
required to remain in jail longer while awaiting their day in court. i
191. See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
192. The seek justice standard is an example of an ethics rule couched in subjective
terms. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. The absence of objective criteria in
the seek justice standard makes the rule nebulous and impossible to enforce. See
supra note 167 and accompanying text. A second ethics rule couched in subjective
terms is N.Y. Code EC 8-4, which prohibits a prosecutor from acting unless he "con-
scientiously believes [his action] to be in the public interest." N.Y. Code, supra note
150, EC 8-4; see also supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text. This rule establishes
an entirely subjective standard since it is impossible to determine if a prosecutor actu-
ally believed he was acting in the public's interest. Id. The requirement that a prose-
cutor exercise sound discretion in the performance of his duties is a third rule couched
in subjective terms. See infra note 196. Actions seemingly "sound" to one prosecutor
may appear foolish to another.
193. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
196. See Standards for Criminal Justice, supra note 150, Standard 3-12(b) ("[The
prosecutor must exercise sound discretion in the performance of his or her
functions.").
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Attorney acted illegally or unethically. Rather, it indicates the need
to modify the plea bargaining ban to avoid irreparable harm to the
Bronx criminal justice system. This part proposes two possible modi-
fications: (1) extending the time in which to allow plea bargaining;
and (2) using written guidelines in the plea bargaining process.'9
A. Extending the Time in Which to Plea Bargain
A major criticism of the Bronx ban is that its coercive nature pres-
sures defendants into making hasty, uninformed decisions.198 Under
the ban, defendants must make crucial decisions on plea offers within
six days, before the grand jury indicts them and the New York City
Criminal Court transfers their cases to the New York Supreme
Court. 199 Defendants often make these decisions without any relevant
information20 0 or sound legal advice.20 ' To temper the coercive na-
ture of the Bronx ban and to allow for more informed decisions by
defendants, the District Attorney should extend the time period in
which the state will plea bargain with indicted defendants.
A reasonable time limit on plea bargaining is not a novel idea. In
1977, the National District Attorneys' Association recommended that
individual jurisdictions "set a time limit after which plea negotiations
may no longer be conducted. ' 202 More recently, a pilot program com-
menced in Brooklyn, New York, under which time limits are imposed
on plea bargaining. 0 3 The pilot program allows defendants to engage
in plea bargaining for sixty days.2 0° On the sixty-first day, the District
Attorney makes a final plea offer. 0 5 If the defendant refuses the of-
fer, the case is immediately scheduled for trial.20 6 The results of the
program are phenomenal-judges have shaved an average of sixty-
five days off the time it takes to dispose of a case; twenty-seven per-
cent more indictments have been disposed of; and there has been a
seventy-eight percent increase in guilty pleas to the severest charge
against a defendant.20 7
197. Although these proposed modifications are discussed separately, they are not
mutually exclusive and could be implemented jointly.
198. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 33 ("The Bronx District Attorney's policy is oner-
ous. It makes sometimes for uninformed decisions.").
199. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
201. See Lynch, supra note 33 ("How can we give good advice to the client when we
have no information?"); see also supra note 110 (commenting on how defendants
must decide whether to plead guilty without the benefit of police reports and other
vital information).
202. See National Prosecution Standards, supra note 36, Standard 16.7.
203. See Anthony M. DeStefano & Patricia Hurtado, B'klyn Makes Case for Faster
Trials. N.Y. Newsday, Apr. 23, 1993, at 8.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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The Brooklyn pilot program provides concrete proof that a prose-
cutor can restrict plea bargaining, be tough on crime, and yet still treat
defendants fairly and reform the criminal justice system. The Bronx
District Attorney should follow Brooklyn's lead and replace the plea
bargaining ban in the New York Supreme Court with a policy that
permits bargaining for a reasonable but limited period of time.
B. Guidelines for Plea Bargaining
Another method of reforming the Bronx plea bargaining ban is
through the use of written guidelines.2°s Like most jurisdictions, the
Bronx does not employ guidelines to regulate plea bargaining.20 The
adverse effects of the Bronx ban, however, demonstrate the need to
adopt such guidelines in the near future.21 0 Implementing plea bar-
gaining guidelines in the Bronx would serve two purposes. First,
guidelines would impose structure on, and control over, the prosecu-
tor's discretion without eliminating the prosecutor's ability to treat
each defendant as an individua.2 I Second, guidelines would "limit
the opportunities for any of the actors [in the criminal justice system]
to stonewall the system at the expense of... others."2 12
The use of written guidelines in New York State's criminal justice
system is not new. In 1978, the New York State Board of Parole im-
plemented written guidelines to control the discretion of parole com-
missioners and to aid them in determining when to release inmates
from state prisons. Under the parole guidelines, inmates are given
numerical scores in two categories-offense severity214 and prior
208. The use of written guidelines for prosecutors is not novel. The Standards for
Criminal Justice list seven factors to guide prosecutors in exercising their discretion
when deciding whether to initiate criminal charges against a defendant. See Standards
for Criminal Justice, supra note 150, Standard 3-3.9(b)(i)-(vii).
209. See Mirsky, supra note 33, at 2.
210. Id.
211. See Weninger, supra note 6, at 283-85. But cf. Terence Dunworth & Charles D.
Weisselberg, Felony Cases and the Federal Courts: The Guidelines Experience, 66 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 99, 125-40 (1992) (discussing how the use of guidelines in the federal
courts has not controlled prosecutorial discretion but has resulted in disparate treat-
ment of certain classes of offenders).
212. Mirsky, supra note 33, at 3.
213. N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-c(4) (McKinney 1991); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs.
tit. 9, §§ 8001.3, 8002.3(a)-(b) (1991).
214. N.Y. Comp. Codes R.& Regs. tit. 9, § 8001.3(b)(3) (1991); Revised Guidelines
for Parole Board Decision Making, N.Y.S. Div. of Parole (Oct. 1978) [hereinafter
Revised Guidelines]. In the offense severity category, inmates receive scores in the
following three subcategories: (1) felony class of conviction; (2) weapon involvement;
and (3) forcible contact. Id. at 3. In New York State, felonies are classified from A
through E, with A felonies being the most serious. N.Y. Penal Law §§ 55.00(1)(a)-(e),
70.00(2)(a)-(e) (McKinney 1992). Under the guidelines, inmates convicted of class A
felonies receive a score of five; inmates convicted of class B felonies receive a score
four, and so on. Revised Guidelines, supra, at 3. After receiving a score on the class
of felony for which they were convicted, inmates are scored on weapon possession. If
a weapon was possessed during the commission of the crime, the inmate receives one
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criminal history."' 5 The two scores are then added together and
matched against a guideline time range which indicates the suggested
time an inmate should serve in prison.216 Inmates who commit serious
crimes and have lengthy criminal histories receive high scores under
the guidelines and are severely penalized by the Parole Board by be-
ing forced to serve lengthy periods of incarceration. 1 7 Conversely,
inmates who commit less serious crimes and have no criminal histories
benefit most from the guidelines by being released early from prison
by the Parole Board.1 8
Guidelines similar to those governing parole could be implemented
easily and efficiently in the Bronx to regulate the plea bargaining pro-
cess. Under such a guideline system, the District Attorney could re-
strict or refuse to plea bargain with career criminals charged with
serious offenses-defendants who score high under the guideline sys-
tem. On the other hand, defendants who score low under the guide-
lines-those charged with less serious offenses and who do not have
lengthy criminal histories-would be given reasonable plea offers by
the District Attorney. By implementing guidelines, the Bronx District
Attorney could restore plea bargaining and ameliorate the harsh ef-
fects of the ban, maintain a tough stance on crime, and reinstill a sense
of fairness in the criminal justice system.
point. If no weapon was possessed, the inmate does not receive any points. Id. Next,
the inmate receives a score on the amount of forcible contact he had with the victim.
Physical injury to the victim results in one point, serious injury results in two points,
and death results in three points. Id. The higher an inmate scores in these three cate-
gories, the more likely he will be penalized by the Parole Board under the guideline
system. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 8001.3(b)(3); Revised Guidelines,
supra, at 2.
215. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs., tit. 9 § 8001.3(b)(3) (1991); Revised Guide-
lines, supra note 214, at 4. In the prior criminal history category, inmates receive
scores in the following six subcategories: (1) number of prior misdemeanor convic-
tions; (2) number of prior felony convictions; (3) number of prior jail terms; (4)
number of prior prison terms; (5) prior probation/parole revocations; and (6) whether
the inmate was on probation/parole at the time he committed the current offense. Id.
For instance, an inmate with up to two prior misdemeanor convictions will receive
zero points, while an inmate with three or more misdemeanor convictions will receive
one point. Id. Likewise, an inmate with one prior felony conviction will receive one
point, while an inmate with three or more prior felony convictions will receive three
points. Id. Again, the higher an inmate scores in these categories, the more likely he
will be penalized by the Parole Board under the guidelines. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. &
Regs. tit. 9, § 8001.3(b)(3); Revised Guidelines, supra note 214, at 2.
216. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 8001.3(b)(3) (1991); Revised Guide-
lines, supra note 214, at 2. A point system similar to that used by New York State's
Division of Parole was used in El Paso, Texas to determine if defendants were eligible
for probation. Weninger, supra note 6, at 286 n.90.
217. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 8001.3(b)(3) (1991); Revised Guide-
lines, supra note 214, at 2; see also supra notes 214-15 (explaining the guidelines used
by the New York State Board of Parole); Weninger, supra note 6, at 286-89 (com-
menting on the judicial guidelines used in plea bargaining in El Paso, Texas).
218. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs., tit. 9, § 8001.8(b)(3) (1991); Revised
Guidelines, supra note 214; supra notes 214-15.
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CONCLUSION
The ban on plea bargaining has severely impacted the Bronx crimi-
nal justice system. The overall adverse effects of the plea bargaining
ban suggest that the Bronx District Attorney may be acting unethi-
cally. An examination of the relevant ethics rules, however, reveals
that the standards governing the Bronx District Attorney's behavior
are nebulous, provide no concrete standards upon which to judge his
behavior, and afford him tremendous latitude in exercising his discre-
tion. This discretion makes the Bronx District Attorney's behavior
nearly irreproachable under ethical standards. Furthermore, not all of
the effects of the Bronx plea bargaining ban have been adverse. The
few positive effects of the plea bargaining ban could lead one to con-
clude that the Bronx District Attorney was being innovative in his
attempt, through the ban, to pressure the state to provide much
needed additional courtroom space and judges.
But while the Bronx District Attorney's behavior does not appear
to violate any ethics rules, his behavior is nonetheless adversely im-
pacting the Bronx criminal justice system. To avoid further deteriora-
tion and possible irreparable harm to the Bronx criminal justice
system, the Bronx District Attorney needs to take prompt and defini-
tive action. Two possible courses of action are available. First, the
District Attorney could expand the time allotted for plea bargaining
so that defendants would have sufficient time to secure the informa-
tion necessary to assist them in deciding whether or not to plead
guilty. Second, the District Attorney could implement written guide-
lines governing the plea bargaining process to prevent abuses of dis-
cretion and to ensure that appropriate sentences are imposed on
defendants.
In the absence of modifications, the Bronx plea bargaining ban is
destined to fail, and the Bronx District Attorney will be forced to re-
scind his ban and restore plea bargaining, as was done in Alaska and
El Paso County, Texas. The Bronx ban should serve as a model to
other jurisdictions that are contemplating banning plea bargaining, al-
erting them to the dangers of banning the principal means of resolu-
tion in our criminal justice system. If plea bargaining bans like the
Bronx ban are to succeed, controls are needed to guide prosecutors in
exercising their discretion.
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